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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Ronald Ray Henry appeals from the summary dismissal of his second 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
According to the Idaho Court of Appeals, Henry was charged with rape, 
burglary, grand theft, and false imprisonment based upon the following facts: 
Henry and the victim met in a bar on the evening in question 
and consumed alcoholic drinks together. The two left the 
establishment together and rode in the victim's car, with Henry 
driving, to a garage that contained a trailer where Henry was 
residing. According to the victim, Henry then physically accosted 
her, struck her in the face when she resisted, and raped her. The 
victim escaped and ran to a nearby hotel wearing only sweatpants, 
and the police were summoned. The police located the victim's 
other articles of clothing in the garage. The victim told police that 
her rapist had a tattoo on his arm or neck that read "Compton." 
The victim's car was missing from the scene and, two days later, 
Henry was apprehended by Montana authorities while driving it. 
Evidence at trial established that Henry has a "Compton" tattoo on 
his arm. Photographs admitted at trial showed injuries to the 
victim's face, and a medical examination found sperm in her body. 
State v. Henry, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 326, Docket No. 33116, pp.1-2 
(Idaho App. Jan. 17, 2008) (hereinafter "Slip Op."). At trial, a jury convicted 
Henry of all the charges. ~ The district court sentenced Henry to twenty-five 
years with six and one-half years fixed for rape, six years with one and one-half 
years fixed for burglary, six years with one and one-half years fixed for grand 
1 
theft, and one year of local jail for false imprisonment. (#39775 R., pp.1, 14, 19-
20, 23, 27.) 1 
On appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals, Henry presented two issues, 
challenging only his rape conviction: (1) whether the district court erred by 
allowing a detective to testify that substances other than alcohol could have 
caused the victim's symptoms of intoxication (but precluding testimony about 
what specific type of drug might have been involved)2; and (2) prosecutorial 
misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error by arguing during closing 
argument, without any support, that Henry had given the victim a date rape drug. 
Slip Op. at p.3. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Henry's judgment of 
conviction for rape, concluding the district court did not err in its evidentiary ruling 
regarding the detective's testimony, and that Henry failed to demonstrate the 
prosecutor's closing argument constituted fundamental error, or, alternatively, 
that the prosecutor's argument was not harmless. See generally Slip Op. 
Following his direct appeal, Henry filed a post-conviction petition, which, 
after being amended twice, presented three basic claims,3 described by the 
district court as: 
1 On August 26, 2014, this Court entered an Order Taking Judicial Notice, in 
which it took judicial notice of the "Court file, Clerk's Record and Reporter's 
Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 39775, Henry v. State." (#41847 R., p.26.) 
2 Both the district court and the Idaho Court of Appeals deemed the detective's 
testimony relevant to showing the cause of the victim's intoxication in light of the 
victim's testimony that she was "more intoxicated than she had been on past 
occasions when consuming a like amount of alcohol." Slip Op. at pp.2-3. 
3 Henry's initial post-conviction petition included four general claims, including 
the three claims that were finally presented. (#39775 R., p.2.) Henry also initially 
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1) that the judgment and sentence are in violation of the 
Constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho; 2) that 
the prosecutor's misconduct resulted in a violation of due process; 
and 3) that the conviction is subject to collateral attack on the 
grounds of ineffective assistance of pre-trial counsel, trial counsel, 
and post-trial counsel. 
(#39775 R., p.29; see #39775 R., pp.1-9, 13-18, 22-25.) Additionally, Henry filed 
an affidavit asserting a variety of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
(Attachment to Succ. Pet., 7/12/10 Aff. of Ronald Henry.)4 
After the state filed a motion for summary dismissal, the court held a 
hearing on that motion. (#39775 R., pp.29-34.) During the hearing, Henry's 
counsel attempted to clarify the nature of Henry's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. First, counsel explained, "it's our position that the ineffective 
assistance of counsel acted in concert with the prosecutorial misconduct to 
prejudice Mr. Henry in this case" by trial counsel's alleged failure to object to 
prosecutorial misconduct in questioning witnesses and closing argument. 
(#39775, 1/13/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-24.) Second, Henry's counsel said he was 
relying on the allegations Henry made in his affidavit, dated July 12, 2010, 
claiming Henry's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) subpoena the five 
specified 40 claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, four claims of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, four claims of ineffective 
assistance of direct appeal counsel, and eight claims of "judge's errors." 
(#39775, pp.5-8.) 
4 On February 9, 2015, this Court granted Respondent's Motion to Augment the 
Appellate Record with Henry's successive post-conviction petition (with 
attachments). (2/9/15 Order Granting Motion to Augment.) Henry's successive 
petition will be cited as "Succ. Pet." On February 13, 2015, the state filed a 
Second Motion to Augment the Appellate Record and Statement in Support 
Thereof, which, at the time of the filing of this brief, is pending. Documents listed 
in that motion will be identified following the designation "Second Augmentation." 
3 
named witnesses for trial (paragraph 5 of the affidavit), (b) cross-examine the 
victim about a telephone call she received from her husband (paragraph 6A of 
the affidavit), (c) adequately advise Henry about whether he should testify 
(paragraph 7 of the affidavit), and (d) object to the prosecutor's alleged 
misconduct of referring to the complaining witness as the "victim."5 (#39775, 
1/13/12 Tr., p.7, L.6- p. 9, L.14.) 
After a hearing, the district court granted the state's motion for summary 
dismissal, concluding Henry's claims failed to present a prima facie case for 
relief. (#39775 R., pp.29-35.) Although Henry initiated an appeal of the 
summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition, he later filed a motion to 
voluntarily dismiss that appeal, which this Court granted. (#39775 R., pp.36-39 
(Notice of Appeal); 12/31/12 Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal (Court file of 
Docket #39775); 1 /3/13 "Remittitur" (Court file of Docket #39775 (noting Henry's 
Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal was granted on Jan. 2, 2013); see #41847 
R., p.26 (8/26/14 Order Taking Judicial Notice of various documents in Supreme 
Court No. 39775, including the "Court file").) 
On December 12, 2012, Henry filed a successive petition for post-
conviction relief. (Succ. Pet., p.1.) In his successive petition, Henry raised the 
following four general claims: 
(a) Conviction is in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States or the State of Idaho. 
5 Although Henry's post-conviction counsel stated at the outset of the summary 
dismissal motion hearing that he was "pursuing specifically grounds BA and 88" 
of the amended petition (#39775, 1/13/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-5), Henry's claim of 
ineffective assistance of various counsel is presented in ground SC of the second 
Amended Petition (#39775 R., p.24). 
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(b) There exists evidence of material facts not previously 
presented and heard that would require the vacation of the 
conviction. 
(c) Ineffective assistance of counsel by all attorneys in all 
phases involved. 
(d) [P]rosecutorial misconduct. 
(Succ. Pet., p.2.) 
In addition to the above-described general claims, Henry presented 34 
specific claims of ineffective assistance by his various attorneys. (See Succ. 
Pet., pp.4-5.) On December 14, 2012, the district court entered an order 
dismissing Henry's successive petition, explaining it was not filed in a timely 
manner, did not set forth any new grounds, and "is merely a repeat of his original 
petition. 116 (Second Augmentation: 12/14/12 Order Dismissing Succ. Pet. For 
Post-Conv. Relief.) After Henry filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal of his 
successive post-conviction petition, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order 
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal, requiring Henry to file a response within 21 
days to show good cause why his appeal should not be dismissed "for failure to 
conform to the good faith requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2." (Second 
Augmentation: 2/1/13 Order Cond. Dismissing Appeal.) After Henry failed to file 
a response, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an Order Dismissing Appeal, 
followed by a Remittitur. (Second Augmentation: 5/13/13 Order Dismissing 
Appeal; 6/12/13 Remittitur.) 
6 The district court further explained, "[t]he second and third pages of the current 
petition are not even originals, but merely photographic copies of pages 2 and 3 
of his original petition." (Second Augmentation: 12/14/12 Order Dismissing Succ. 
Pet. For Post-Conv. Relief.) 
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On October 29, 2013, Henry filed a motion for permission to file a second 
successive post-conviction petition (captioned "Motion for Leave to File 
Successive Petition and Memorandum in Support"), a supporting affidavit, and a 
motion for the appointment of counsel. (Second Augmentation: 10/29/13 Motion 
for Leave to File Succ. Petition (etc.); 10/29/13 Affidavit of Ronald Ray Henry; 
10/29/13 Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel.) The 
district court construed that motion as a second successive petition for post-
conviction relief. (#41847 R., pp.11-12.) Henry's second successive petition 
presented thirteen claims of ineffective assistance by all his previous counsel, 
alleging, inter a/ia, in brief summary: 
(1) failure to perform certain duties (e.g., investigate facts, 
locate and question potential witnesses, examine the prosecution's 
evidence, etc.), resulting in Henry's inability to "present a legitimate 
defense;" 
(2) failure to obtain testing on DNA evidence from the rape kit 
tested by the state; 
(3) failure to obtain phone records to disprove the victim's 
statement that her husband called her at 11 :30 p.m. on the evening 
of the incident; 
(4) failure to develop a trial strategy by questioning and 
investigating the victim for mental deficiencies and proclivities; 
(5) same as number (1) regarding failure to investigate; 
(6) failure to conduct a rudimentary adversarial challenge to the 
prosecutor's version of the facts; 
(7) failure to challenge various abuses of discretion by the court, 
including the refusal to provide required jury instructions and 
allowing irrelevant and unsubstantiated evidence (claim of a bloody 
smudge on a lawn chair pad and suggestions the victim was given 
a date rape drug and forced to perform oral sex); 
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(8) failure to consult with Henry; 
(9) same as number (8) 
(10) no specific claim stated, only legal standards for attorneys; 
(11) failure of appellate and post-conviction counsel to present 
legitimate issues; 
(12) defense counsel made unsuitable comments, denied Henry 
his right to testify, and presented an insufficient opening statement 
and closing argument; 
(13) failure to move for dismissal or directed verdict on the basis 
of insufficient evidence. 
(Second Augmentation: Motion for Leave to File Succ. Pet. (etc.), pp.7-18.) 
Henry also presented six claims of prosecutorial misconduct, essentially alleging 
that the prosecutor allowed false testimony to be presented throughout the 
state's case, improperly suggested the victim had been given a date rape drug, 
and failed to disclose information. (Id., pp.18-23.) Henry lastly claimed that the 
cumulative effect of errors rose to the level of fundamental error. (Id. pp.23-25.) 
On December 13, 2013, the district court issued a notice of intent to 
dismiss, setting forth the grounds on which it intended to dismiss Henry's second 
successive petition and giving Henry 20 days to file a response. (#41847 R., 
pp.11-12). Thecourtexplained: 
[Y]our motion for permission to file a successive petition for post-
conviction relief (treated here as a petition for post-conviction relief) 
will be dismissed for the reason that you have not alleged any new 
grounds for relief, or presented any admissible evidence to support 
any new grounds for relief. The grounds for relief you alleged were 
either included in your prior appeal of your criminal conviction, 
included in your prior petition(s) for post-conviction relief, or could 
have been included in your appeal of your criminal conviction or 
prior petition(s) for post-conviction relief. 
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As an additional ground, you have not supported your 
allegations with any admissible evidence. 
(#41847 R., p.11.) That same day, the court entered "Findings Regarding Motion 
for Appointment of Counsel on Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," 
denying Henry's request for appointed counsel. (#41847 R., pp.13-15.) 
After Henry failed to file a response the court's notice of intent to dismiss, 7 
the court entered an order of dismissal and a judgment. (#41847 R., pp.16-17, 
21-22.) Henry filed a "Petition for Reconsideration Pursuant to Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rules 12 and 41," seeking reconsideration of both the summary 
dismissal of Henry's petition and the denial of Henry's motion for appointed 
counsel. (Second Augmentation: 1/2/14 Petition for Reconsideration (etc.).) 
Four days later, the court issued an "Order Denying Motion to Reconsider."8 
(#41847 R., pp.18-19.) Henry filed a timely notice of appeal. (#41847 R., pp.27-
36.) 
7 According to the Register of Actions, the only pleading filed by Henry during 
the 20-day period he was given to respond to the court's notice of intent to 
dismiss occurred on January 2, 2014, when Henry filed a Petition for 
Reconsideration. (#41847 R., p.9.) That Petition for Reconsideration was 
apparently filed in regard to the denial of Henry's motion for appointed counsel 
inasmuch as four days after that petition was filed, the court entered an order 
denying Henry's "Motion to Reconsider the court's denial of his earlier motion to 
appoint counsel." (#41847 R., p.18 (emphasis added).) 
8 The district court's Order Denying Motion to Reconsider stated, "The 
petitioner's Motion to Reconsider the court's denial of his earlier motion to 
appoint counsel is denied." (#41847 R., p.18.) Inasmuch as Henry's "Petition for 
Reconsideration" requested reconsideration of both the summary dismissal of his 
second successive petition and his motion for appointed counsel, it appears that 




Henry's statement of issues on appeal is too lengthy to repeat in its 
entirety. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.2-4 (identifying 20 issues).) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Henry failed to show error in the dismissal of his second 
successive post-conviction petition and denial of his motion for reconsideration? 
2. Has Henry failed to show error in the denial of his request for the 




Henry Has Failed To Show Error In The Dismissal Of His Second Successive 
Post-Conviction Petition And Denial Of His Motion For Reconsideration 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed Henry's second successive petition because 
(1) he failed to allege "any new grounds for relief," (2) the grounds for relief either 
were, or could have been, included in Henry's direct appeal or prior post-
conviction petition(s), and (3) he failed to support his "allegations with any 
admissible evidence." (#41847 R., p.11.) Henry fails to demonstrate error by the 
district court in summarily dismissing his second successive petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
The decision of a trial court to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is 
reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Lea 
Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 212, 177 P.3d 955, 959 (2008); Straub v. Smith, 
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145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754, 760 (2007); Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 
592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001 ). 
C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Henry's Second Successive 
Petition And Denied His Motion To Reconsider 
On appeal, Henry asserts that his failure to raise issues contained within 
his second successive post-conviction petition "was strictly due to the material 
and controlling factor(s) that -- all previously appointed counsel failed to litigate 
any of those issues which are now brought before either the district court, or this 
court." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Henry cites Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 
635 P.2d 955 (1981), in support of his argument that the alleged ineffective 
assistance of his prior post-conviction counsel constitutes "sufficient reason(s)" 
for permitting him to file a second successive post-conviction petition. See I.C. § 
19-4908.9 Henry's arguments fail because (1) as the district court concluded, the 
claims in his second successive petition were, or could have been, previously 
presented, and (2) the Palmer basis for showing a "sufficient reason" to avoid the 
I.C. § 19-4908 bar to successive petitions is no longer valid law. 
9 Idaho Code § 19-4908 governs the filing of successive petitions and provides: 
Waiver of or failure to assert claims. - All grounds for 
relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his 
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally 
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction 
or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to 
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, 
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in 
the original, supplemental, or amended application. 
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The district court correctly concluded that, because the claims in Henry's 
second successive petition were previously presented, or could have been 
presented, in either his direct appeal or his initial post-conviction proceeding, he 
was barred from presenting those claims in a second successive petition. I.C. § 
19-4908. Although the court did not specifically cite I.C. § 19-4908 in its Order 
Denying Motion and Notice of Intent to Dismiss, that Order was plainly based on 
that statue, stating: 
Notice is hereby given to the petitioner that your motion for 
permission to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief 
(treated here as a petition for post-conviction relief) will be 
dismissed for the reason that you have not alleged any new 
grounds for relief, or presented any admissible evidence to support 
any new grounds for relief. The grounds for relief you alleged were 
either included in your prior appeal of your criminal conviction, 
included in your prior petition(s) for post-conviction relief, or could 
have been included in your appeal of your criminal conviction or 
prior petition(s) for post-conviction relief. 
(#41847 R., p.11.) On appeal, Henry does not contest the district court's 
conclusion that he either presented his second successive claims previously, or 
could have done so, stating: 
[Henry] asserts that the reason(s) he failed to raise the 
issues contained within his "second or successive post-conviction 
application" and "memorandum of law in support of post-conviction 
relief' was strictly due to the material and controlling factor(s) that --
all previously appointed counsel failed to litigate any of those issues 
which are now brought before either the district court, or this court. 
From [direct appeal] to all previous [post-conviction 
applications], the appellant suffered the inapt [sic] representation(s) 
from appointed counsel by the district court and not one single 
educated attorney has ever litigated the contained constitutional 
issues/violations which the appellant has strived to litigate before 
any court of law. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5 (capitalization modified; bracketed comments original).) 
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In short, Henry does not take issue with the district court's finding that the 
claims in his second successive petition were either presented previously, or 
could have been presented in a prior proceeding. Instead, Henry alleges his 
prior post-conviction counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
adequately present his claims, citing Palmer as the basis for skirting the 
successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908. (Id., p.6.) 
However, the Palmer exception to the statutory bar to successive petitions 
has been overruled by Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 391, 327 P .3d 365, 367 
(2014), in which the Supreme Court succinctly said: "We hold that that [sic] 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under 
I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a successive petition, and thus, overrule Palmer v. 
Dermitt." Because ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a 
sufficient reason for overcoming the successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908, 
Henry has failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his successive 
post-conviction petition or its denial of his motion to reconsider. 
11. 
Henry Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request For Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Henry contends the district court erred in denying his request for counsel, 
asserting he "raised sufficient claims before the district court" to justify the 
appointment of counsel. (Appellant's Brief, p.37.) Review of the record and the 
applicable legal standards shows the district court correctly concluded Henry was 
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not entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent him on an improper 
second successive petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A decision to grant or deny a request for counsel in post-conviction cases 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 393, 327 
P.3d 365, 369 (2014). 
C. Henry Was Not Entitled To Counsel To Represent Him On His Second 
Successive Petition 
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the 
UPCPA, a court-appointed attorney 'may be made available' to an applicant who 
is unable to pay the costs of representation." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327 
P.3d at 369 (quoting I.C. § 19-4904; citing Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 
792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004)). "The standard for determining whether to 
appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is 
whether the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim." 
Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369 (citing Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007)). "In deciding whether the prose petition 
raises the possibility of a valid claim, the trial court should consider whether the 
facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be 
willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims." 
Swaderv. State, 143 Idaho 651,654,152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007). The appointment 
of counsel is not appropriate for the purpose of searching the record for 
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potentially nonfrivolous claims; rather, the petition itself must allege the facts that 
raise the possibility of a valid claim before the appointment of counsel is 
warranted. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369 (citing Swader, 143 Idaho 
at 654, 152 P.3d at 15). 
The district court cited the foregoing standards and denied Henry's 
request for counsel because Henry failed to show a sufficient reason for pursuing 
a successive petition as required by I.C. § 19-4908 and, as such, there was no 
possibly valid claim entitling Henry to counsel. (#41847 R., pp.13-15.) Although 
Henry believes otherwise (Appellant's Brief, p.37), as discussed in the preceding 
argument, the record supports the district court's conclusion. See Murphy, 156 
Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (finding no error in failing to appoint counsel to 
represent petitioner on an improper successive petition). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's 
dismissal of Henry's second successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2015. 
~~ JOHN . McKINNEY (jl) 
Dep
1
~ Attorney General V 
V 
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